

Recap - Col and UC Register Focus for 2021



External Stakeholders

- Awareness rather than content
- CITA: more focus on impact on consumers esp. vulnerable

Internal stakeholders

- Awareness
- Unwieldy
- Relevance to Smart System evolution

| | | dssociation |
|---|---|--|
| STOP | START | CONTINUE |
| | Refresher Webinar Blogs/Social Media Engage ENA Customer & Social Issues Group to monitor / advise on vulnerable customer impacts More explicit links with DSO implementation plans? | Heatmap focus Updated Flags Publish Steering Group updates Mitigation focused approach to Advisory Group engagement |
| • Quarterly updates – move to 6 monthly with an interim refresh | Separate systemic risks from more actionable risks – subregisters that fit one page Review and communicate interactions with DSO implementation plans Refresher Webinar Blogs/Social Media | Heatmap focus Publish Steering Group updates Filters by Product / Owners Updated flags Workstream AoBs |

Col and UC Register Q2 Update



Process Changes

- Detailed review 6 monthly (Q2 and Q4); Heatmaps review (Q1 and Q3)
- ENA Customer and Social Issues (C&SI) Working Group engaged re: risks with direct customer impacts
- More clarity on interactions with DSO Implementation Plans
- Risk owner and stakeholder communication / engagement plan

Structural Changes

- Systemic risks split out separately smaller sub-registers
- Risks captured by Heatmaps identified in Register
- Risks monitored by ENA Customer & Social Issues Working Group identified in Register
- Filters by Product / Organisation Owner

Content Updates

- Mostly nil responses due to the major update in March
- Ofgem A&FLC SCR decision captured
- Flexible Connection (ANM) Stakeholder Focus Group Workshops and recent deliverables captured
- Work on WS1AP5 Primacy Rules for Service Conflicts commenced

Col & UC Risks Monitored by ENA Customer & Social Issues Working Group



| | Risk Description |
|-------|---|
| Col 9 | IDNO revenue driven by demand so no incentive exists to encourage alternate solutions; customers on these networks cannot benefit from flexibility services |
| A1 | Inclusivity: Unequal opportunities for different customer groups wishing to participate in flexibility markets and in particular vulnerable customers |
| A2 | Perceived unfairness or consumer backlash from a move away from 'postage stamp' principles (charges are the same for all customers within a DNO area) |
| A3 | Electricity supply availability/performance becomes inconsistent across different areas. Customers experience outages. |
| A4 | Third party intermediaries do not act in consumer interest leading to industry dissatisfaction. Consumers may not see the full value for their services. Poor consumer experience could reduce the levels of engagement. |
| A6 | Consumers on passive networks end up paying for DSO operations, for which they perceive they do not see benefits |
| A7 | A diminishing share of electricity customers are left to pick up more of the network costs |

Systemic Risks

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Determining "Systemic Risks"

- Largely systemic to the energy industry
- Mitigation sits primarily with other bodies e.g. Ofgem or BEIS
- Risks that are very broad / can never be fully mitigated and therefore captured within the principles of the DSO Implementation Plans
- Subjective to a degree

Conflicts Of Interest - Systemic Risks (2 out of 9)

| COI | Risk | |
|-------|---|--|
| COI_8 | Market dominance abuse of flexibility provider/lack of market liquidity and competition | |
| Col_9 | IDNO revenue driven by demand so no incentive exists to encourage alternate solutions | |

<u>Unintended Consequences - Systemic Risk examples (23 of 33)</u>



| UC | | Risk |
|--|----|--|
| | A2 | Perceived unfairness or consumer backlash from a move away from 'postage stamp' principles (charges are the same for all customers within a DNO area) |
| Distributio- nal Customer Impacts | А3 | Electricity supply availability/performance becomes inconsistent across different areas. Customers experience outages. |
| | A4 | Third party intermediaries do not act in consumer interest leading to industry dissatisfaction. Consumers may not see the full value for their services. Poor consumer experience could reduce the levels of engagement. |
| | A6 | Consumers on passive networks end up paying for DSO operations, for which they perceive they do not see benefits |
| | Α7 | A diminishing share of electricity customers are left to pick up more of the network costs |
| Risk of Regret | B1 | Higher costs to UK customers - Industry is too focused on markets and overlooks the benefits of technological solutions |
| | B2 | Stranding of flexibility assets; conversely this may be a good outcome if a net saving to UK current and future customers |
| | В3 | Network companies spend money building out SO functions which are not needed in the medium/long term because better network access arrangements and charging signals are in place |
| | B4 | Network consumers overpaying or the business cases for existing Flexibility Service Providers (FSPs) disappears. |
| | В7 | Stakeholders take inappropriate actions based on misunderstanding of network capacity information |
| Operational Viability | C4 | Lack of incentives for innovation in technological solutions |

| UC | | Risk | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---|--|
| System Security | D5 D6 D8 | Increasing reliance on communications infrastructure System security impacted as a result of gaming Reduced headroom (as a result of efficient markets). Information availability facilitates hackers and cyber criminals Reduced system security | |
| | E1 | Risk of existing mandatory requirements becoming "paid services" (E.g.Power Quality / Inertia), potentially increasing cost to consumers | |
| Market . | E2 | Risk that information being shared via the Embedded Capacity Register (ECR) provides parties with an unfair market advantage. | |
| power and gaming | E3 | Ability for generators to trade ROCs (or equivalent) rates for flexibility amongst themselves | |
| | E4 | Giving third parties visibility of emerging constraints may provide them with the ability to trigger those constraints which they are then paid to resolve | |
| | E5 | Lack of incentives for innovation in commercial solutions, potentially preventing smaller Market Actors from adopting a more innovative delivery approach or flexibility coming to market | |
| Market Power & Gaming | F1 | DNO / TO connection timelines can erode the business case for services | |
| | F2 | Regulatory claw-back of asset allowances / funding for flexibility procurement | |



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